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INTERNATIONAL LAW
Applied to The
TREATY OF PEACE
Considering the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, as they relate to the
actual settlements, from the standpoint of International Law, it may be
affirmed that no modern, treaty of peace has done this system such violence;
certainly not the cynical treaty of Vienna of 1815. For the treaty, in spite of
the wickedness of its settlements, left us some progressive principles of the
utmost value, notably that of the freedom of international rivers. Further,
its labors in behalf of the abolition of the slave-trade were surely worthy of
the world's approval.
In the Treaty of Versailles, however, it is difficult to find a single pro-
gressive principle established, while rule after rule of the law of nations here-
tofore recognized as instituted for the protection of all states, is ignored or
violated where it conflicts with the purposes of the respective Allied and
Associated Powers.
The validity of title founded in conquest is not abolished, as it might
have been, and as the world was led to believe it would be; embodied as it
was in the preliminaries to negotiation. The recognition of the secret treaties,
confirming the rights of conquest, stood in the way of this benign possibility.
The plebiscite, designed to prevent the handing of peoples around like
flocks of the field, was not established as a principle of the law of nations,
as the world was also led to expect it would be. There is only a very
restricted application of it in the terms, and with respect to some territories,
it is denied altogether.
Neither is the right of option, designed for the protection of individuals
of minorities, established. It is permitted in some instances of cession, but
withheld altogether in others.
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As to the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is a reactionary institu-
tion rather than a progressive one, in that it ignores the whole modern trend
toward the establishment of international relations upon the foundations of
law, rather than upon compromise and expediency. The Covenant of the
League of Nations looks to the establishment of superintendence over inter-
national relations by political as distinguished from legal methods. There is
not a single reference to international law in the whole Covenant that points
to any definite plan whatever for the progressive improvement and exten-
sion of that law. In neither the Council of the League of Nations nor in any
body to function under it, in the proposed settlement of disputes, is there any
provision for the limitation of their actions within the settled principles of law.
It is possible for the League of Nations to take up and carry on the achieve-
ments of the last two decades, starting where the Hague Conferences left off
and looking to the progressive development of law and the substitution of
judicial settlements for mere arbitration based on compromise, but such an
intention is nowhere manifested in the Covenant. In fact there appears to
be almost a complete abandonment of the lessons of the past.
Not only does the Treaty of Versailles fail to lend its great sanction to
the establishment of progressive principles, but it sets aside, so far as future
validity is concerned, many principles wrung only with the most laborious
effort from a self-interested world. Thus the rules instituted for the protec-
tion of private property on land and in territorial waters, and even that pro-
tecting the piyate property of prisoners of war, are swept aside. The settled
distinctions with respect to belligerent rights of destruction, and those limiting
the exercise of beligerent force within lawful bounds, are confounded. The
effect of the outbreak of war on treaties is thrown into greater confusion than
ever by reason of inconsistent and contradictory action.
In the stipulation for the trial and punishment of those German nationals
found guilty of violations of the laws of civilized warfare a wholesome step
forward has been taken calculated to sustain these laws in the times to come
and to promote their observance.
It was not necessary to the placing of the severest burdens upon Germany
to have declared that Germany must accept the responsibility for causing all
loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated governments and their
nations have been subjected; for, as pointed out in the discussion of the
article, the laws of war plainly distinguish between lawful and unlawful loss
and damage. The amount of unlawful loss and damage for which Germany
is responsible, in view of her utterly barbarous methods of carrying on war,
probably far exceeds any sum which may ultimately be received. To have
adhered to these laws in assessing reparation-as it is proposed to invoke
the law in the infliction of.punishments-would have done incalculable service
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toward the effective establishment of these restraints upon warlike violence.
In the failure of the Allied and Associated governments to take this
course, they have established a precedent which future belligerents will fail
to act upon in freeing themselves from heretofore fixed limitations upon the
use of force. It must be borne in mind that one of the sources of Interna-
tional Law is just such a great international congress as that assembled at
Versailles; it is these gatherings mainly that make and unmake itJ principles.
Such congresses are therefore under a very solemn responsibility to the future
of the world.
In the preface to Prof. William E. Hall's scholarly treatise on Interna.
tional Law, which has run through many editions, is the following remarkable
prophecy, penned in 1889:
"Looking back over the last couple of centuries we see inter-
national law at the close of each fifty years in a more solid position
than that which it occupied at the beginning of the period. Pro-
gressively it has taken firmer hold, it has extended its sphere of
operation, it has ceased to trouble itself about trivial formalities, it
has more and more dared to grapple in detail with the fundamental
facts in the relations of states. The area within which it reigns
beyond dispute has in that time been infinitely enlarged, and it has
been greatly enlarged within the memory of living men. But it
would be idle to pretend that this progress has gone on without
check. In times when wars have been both long and bitter, in
moments of revolutionary passion, on occasions when temptation
and opportunity of selfishness on the part of neutrals have been
great, men have fallen back into disregard of law and even into true
lawlessness. And it would be idle also to pretend that Europe is
not now in great likelihood moving towards a time at which the
strength of international law will be too hardly tried. Probably in
the next great war the questions which have accumulated during the
last half century and more will all be given their answers at once.
Some hates, moreover, will crave for satisfaction; much envy and
greed will be at work; but above all, and at the bottom of all, there
will be the hard sense of necessity. Whole nations will be in the
field; the commerce of the world may be on the sea to win or lose;
national existences will be at stake; men will be tempted to do any-
thing which will shorten hostilities and tend to a decisive issue.
Conduct in the next great war will certainly be hard; it is very
doubtful if it will be scrupulous, whether on the part of belligerents
or neurtals; and most likely the next war will be great. But there
can be very little doubt that if the next war is unscrupulously waged,
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it also will be followed by a reaction towards increased stringency
of law. In a community, as in an individual, passionate excess is
followed by a reaction of lassitude and to some extent of con-
science. On the whole the collective seems to exert itself in this way
more surely than the individual conscience; and in things within the
scope of international law, conscience, if it works less impulsively,
can at least work more freely than in home affairs. Continuing
temptation ceases with the war. At any rate it is a matter of expe-
rience that times, in which international law has been seriously
disregarded, have been followed by periods in which the European
conscience has done penance by putting itself under straiter obli-
gations than those which it before acknowledged. There is no rea-
son to suppose that things will be otherwise in the future. I there-
fore look forward with much misgiving to the manner in which the
next great war will be waged, but with no misgiving at all as to the
character of the rules which will be acknowledged ten years after
its termination, by comparison with the rules now considered to
exist."
Only the first half of this prophecy has been fulfilled; in the pursuit of
material and illogical objects by the Allied and Associated governments the
opportunity to realize the latter half has been postponed to a later time.
The sweeping aside of all restraints by the victors must cause something
of a shock to those who read the articles of the treaty in the belief that the
character of imposed peace has changed.
It is to be hoped, however, that with the cooling of passions and the
coming of sober second thought to the world the influence of the great inter-
national jurists of the United States, of France, of Italy and of Great Britain
will reassert itself toward the readjustment, restatement and restoration of
the principles of International Law, as the only foundation upon which the
relations of nations can rest in definite security.
The following analysis is, of necessity, a mere outline, in which the
articles of the treaty are paraphrased in the interest of brevity; only a work
of volumes would permit of a thorough discussion of the multifarious phases
of the settlement and their relation to and effect upon the law of nations:
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NOTE.-The paragraphs in light face
type are the official text of the treaty; the
paragraphs printed in black face type em-
body the law applicable to each preceding
paragraph of the treaty.
THE TREATY
Part L The Covenant of the League of
Nations.
The High Contracting Parties, in order
to promote international co-operation and
to achieve international peace and
security,
By the acceptance of obligations not to
resort to war,
By the prescription of open, just and
honorable relations between nationq.
By the firm establishment . f the under-
st ,ndings of international law as the actual
rule of conduct among governments, and
By the maintenance of justice and a
scrupulous respect for all treaty obliga-
tions in the dealings of organized peo-
ples with one another.
Agree to this Covenant of this League
of Nations.
Not only does the Covenant fail to pro-
" any means for the "firm establishment
of the understandings of international iw,"
but the treaty itself appears to discard many
vital principles of the customary as well as
of the conventional law of nations. (See
Comment opposite Articles 282-287.)
Article 1. Members of the League shall be
those signatories named in the Annex and
also such of those named (as invited) as
shall accede without reservation by a dec-
claration deposited with the secretariat
within two months of the coming into
force of the treaty.
Thirty-two States, dominions, and colonies
mentioned in the Annex as signatories are
declared members (though China, one of the
seates mentioned, refused to sign) and thir-
teen others are named as those invited to
become members, making forty-five in all.
in 1910, Oppenheim, the eminent English
successor to Westlake as Whewell Professor
at Cambridge, asserted (Vol. 1, Int. Law, pp.
162-64) that there were then in Europe say-
enty-four states possessing international per-
sonality and therefore members of the Fam-
By of Nations. He included the twenty-four
German states and free towns. He cites
twenty-one states in the Americas, one in
Africa and one in Asia. As to China, Siam,
Afghanistan and Thibet he denied to them
the ctatus, asserting that they possess inter-
national personality only for some purpose.
His lir.t embraced ninety-seven. None of the
British dominions or colonies is mentioned
as possessing the essential attributes of an
international person qualified for association
in the Family of Nations. (See W. Allison
Phillips, The Peace Settlements, 1815 and
1919. Edinburgh Review, July, 1919, as to
exclusion of German states from the Holy
Alliance.
Any fully self-governing state, dominion
or colony may become a member if its
admission is agreed to by two-thirds of
the Assembly, provided that it shall give
effective guarantees of its sincere intention
to observe its international obligations and
shall accept such regulations as may be
prescribed by the League as to its military
and naval forces and armaments.
This paragraph confounds all previously
accepted principles with respect to Interna-
tional personality and sovereignty. If it con-
notes the assumption ipso facto by such do-
minion or colony of a bona fide free and
independent status, there is nothing incon-
sistent, but then it would cease to be a do-
minion or colony. Thus the British empire
would be broken up.
Half and part-sovereign states says Op-
penheim (Vol. 1, pp. 529-530) may be par-
ties to international negotiation, but so-called
Colonial states, as the Dominion of Canada,
can never be parties to International negotia-
tion. Thus viewed from the standpoint of the
Law of Nations, the Dominion of Canada, the
Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand
and the Union of South Africa are British
territory. (Ibid Vol. 1, p. 231.)
No genuine League of Nations can be
founded upon such basic inequalities. These
inequalities appear not only in the organic
structure from the outset but they appear
with respect to the treatment of subsequently
admitted members.
Any member may, after two years' no-
tice of its intention so to do, withdraw
from the League, provided that all its in-
ternational obligations and all its obliga-
tions under this Covenant shall have been
fulfilled at the time of withdrawal.
The effect of notice of intended withdrawal
would be immediately to transfer to the
League the power of inquiry into and de-
cision upon the whole body of international
relations of the notifying state. Nor does it
appear that time would bar any case.
In a particular case a state may, of its own
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free will, submit to an outside authority for
decision the question of its fulfillment or
nonfulfillment of certain obligations, without
derogating in any way from its sovereignty;
but to transfer the right of final decision over
the whole of its foreign relations is to yield
the very essence of external sovereignty.
Such state would occupy the position of ward
to the outside authority. (See 1 Halleck, Ch.
III, Sec. 1; Bluntschli, Sec. 64; Vattel, Ch.
1; Manning, p. 93; Hall, Sec. 1; 1 Westlake,
Ch. 3.)
Article 2. The action of the League shall
be effected through the instrumentality of
an Assembly and of a Council, with a per-
manent Secretariat.
Article 3. The Assembly shall consist of
representatives of members of the League.
It shall meet at stated intervals and from
time to time as occasion may require, and
at its meetings may deal with any matter
within the sphere of action of the League
or affecting the peace of the world. At
meetings of the Assembly each member of
the League shall have one vote and not
mor than three representativs.
It will be observed that the Assembly,
which is a representative body, in principle
at least, is not required to meet within any
definite period as is the Council (infra Arti-
cle 4). Although apparently clothed with
concurrent power, it is in vital respects sub-
ordinate to the smaller Council. The basis
of legal equality in any League of Nations
necessarily requires equality in voting. (See
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, Vol.
I, p. 37.)
Article 4. The Council shall consist of rep-
resentatives of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers (the United States,
Great Bfitain, Italy, France and Japan),
together with four other members to be
selected by the Assembly from time to
time in its discretion. Belgium, Brazil,
Spain and Greece are named provisional
members.
It will be noted that the principle of equal-
ity disappears at this point, the five Great
Powers constituting themselves an indefeasi-
ble majority. Yet every attempt at organiz-
ing a League of Nations must start from and
keep intact the independence and equality of
all civilized states. (Oppenheim (1919), The
League of Nations, p. 33.)
With the approval of a majority of the
Assembly, the Council may name addi-
tional members whose representatives shall
have fixed places in the Council.
The Council shall meet from time to
time as occasion may require and at least
once a year, and it may deal with any
matter within the sphere of action of the
League or affecting the peace of the
world.
The enlargement of the Council can take
place only by unanimous consent of the
Council, with the approval of a majority
of the Assembly. Self-interest will always
adjust and readjust the balance in the Coun-
cil.
Any member not represented on the
Council shall be invited to send a repre-
sentative to sit as a member at any meet-
ing during the consideration of matters
specially affecting the interests of such
member.
Although a state whose affairs are under
consideration by the Council may have a
representative thereon, the rule of unanimity
excludes the vote of this added representa-
tive. (Infra Article 5.) Such representa.
tive is therefore not an equal in fact.
At meetings of the Council each mem-
ber represented shall have one vote and
not more than one representative.
While there is equality in the vote of the
Council, the principle is nullified by inequali.
ty of representation.
Article 5. Except where otherwise provid-
ed, decisions of the Assembly and the
Council shall require agreement of all
members represented at the meeting.
Matters of procedure, including appoint-
ment of committees to investigate partic-
ular matters, may be decided by a ma-
jority present.
That is to say, there must be agreement
as to such representatives present.
The first meeting of the Assembly and
the first meeting of the Council shall be
summoned by the President of the United
States.
This would constitute the President of the
United States the presiding officer of both
bodies temporarily, at least.
Article 6. The permanent secretariat shall
be established at the seat of the League.
The secretariat shall comprise a Secretary
General and such other secretaries and
staff as may be required.
The first Secretary-General shall be the
person named in the Annex; thereafter he
shall be appointed by the Couticil with the
approval of a majority of the Assembly.
Secretaries and Staff shall be appointed
by the Secretary General with the ap-
proval of the Council.
The Secretary General shall act in that
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capacity at all meetings of the Assembly
and of the Council.
The expenses of the Secretariat shall be
borne by members in accordance with the
apportionment of expenses of the Interna-
tional Bureau of the Universal Postal
Union.
As to the possible magnitude of the per-
sonnel, see infra Comment opposite Article
282.
Article 7. The seat of the League is es-
tablished at Geneva. The Council may de-
cide at any time to establish the seat else-
where.
All positions under or in connection with
the League including the secretariat, shall
be open equally to men and women.
Representatives of members of the
League and officials of the League when
engaged on the business of the League
shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and im-
munities.
Diplomatic privileges and immunities in-
elude extrs-territorinlity, that is, immunity
from local law, civil and criminal, in for-
sign countries, such immunities extending to
the agent's residence and to those in his
suite. Owing to the inviolability attaching
by the law of nations to the person of a
diplomatic agent, a crime committed against
him is punished with exceptional severity
by the laws of all states. (U. S. vs. Hand,
2 Wash. 435)
The diplomatic immunities extended to all
ofcials of the League must be considered
as deriving from the respect due to the soy-
eseighty of the League as a distinct politi-
a a entity, as the immunities of an ambassa-
dor flow from the respect due to the person
of the sovereign whom he represents.
Yet Article 7 appears to exten the Pin-
ciple far beyond its application even in
the case of ambassadors in clothing these
offcials with the status apparently anywhere
"when engaged on the business of the
League." Diplomatic immunities do not at-
teach under the law of nations to ambassa-
dors passing through third countries. They
can claim no more than courteous treatment.
(I Westlake, pp. 273-275; 1 Oppenhein. pp.
469-470; 1 Twiss, Sec. 222; 1 Wharton, Sec.
97; 4 Moore, Sec. 643.)
By the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, and the
Treaty of London, 1883, instituting the Dan-
ube Commission, the principle of inviolabil-
ity was recognized as between the signato-
ries as attaching to the respective represen-
tatives, their archives, etc. But it was not
contemplated as of universal application, as
in the present instance where League offi-
cials will be sent into the territories of non-
members.
The buildings and other property occu-
pied by the League or its officials or by
representatives attending its meetings shall
be inviolable.
Article 8. The members of the League rec-
ognize that the maintenance of peace re-
quires the reduction of national arma-
ments to the lowest point consistent with
national safety and the enforcement by
common motion of international obliga-
tions.
The Council, taking into account the
geographical situation and circumstances
of each state, shall formulate plans for
such reduction for consideration and ac-
tion of the several governments.
Such plans shall be subject to reconsid-
eration and revision at least every ten
years.
After these plans shall have been adopt-
ed by the several governments the limits
of armaments fixed therein shall not be
exceeded without the concurrence of the
Council.
Members agree that the manufacture by
private enterprise of munitions of war is
open to grave objections. The Council
shall advise how the evil effects can be
prevented.
Members undertake to interchange full
and frank information as to the scale of
their armament, their programs and of
their industries adaptable to warlike pur-
poses.
The deduction is a fair one that "the geo-
graphical situation and circumstances" to
be taken into account in reduction of arma-
ments create an exception in favor of the
Great Powers, whose far-flung empires may
be thought to require large military and na-
val establishments. And the Great Pow-
ers, constituting a dominant force in the
Council, will formulate plans for themselves
as well as for other states.
The hegemony of the Great Powers in the
League is silently recognized throughout the
Covenant. Yet historically a Great Power
of today is not necessarily a Great Power of
tomorrow. Spain, Portugal and Sweden were
Great Powers in 1815. Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Russia were great Powers in
1914.
And, it may be asked, who will keep in
order those who are to keep the world in
order?
Article 9. A permanent Commission shall
be constituted to advise the Council on the
execution of the provisions of Article I
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and 8 relating to military and naval ques-
tions.
This would undoubtedly be a military com-
mission whose functions would include super.
intending disarmament of states newly ad-
mitted as well as directing the forces neces-
sary to vindicate international obligations.
Article 10. Members of the League under-
take to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all
members of the League. In case of any
such aggression or in case of any threat
or danger of such aggression, the Council
shall advise upon the means by which this
obligation shall be fulfilled.
This Article embraces two distinct obliga.-
gions in the first sentence: viz., "To respect"
the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of member states, and to "pre-
serve" the same as against external aggres-
sion.
A state undertaking to respect the terri-
torial integrity of another contracts to re-
frain from doing anything that shall in any
way impair or impeach that territorial integ-
rity, including its possessions, dependencies,
colonies, protectorates, leased territories,
spheres of influence and hinterlands. All of
these terms express degrees of territorial
rights. (1 Westlake Ch. 6.)
Under existing principles of the law of
Nations states are under a general duty to
respect the territory and independence of all
other states. This duty connotes the right
of all states to complete immunity from in-
terference by others. But there are excep-
tions to this general rule recognized by the
law. A state may lawfully decline to re-
spect the territory and independence of an-
other (1) in self-defense, (2) in accordance
with treaty stipulations, (3) on grounds of
humanity, and (4) in behalf of an oppressed
population. (Davis 4 ed. p. 104, Woolsey
Sec. 43; Wheaton sec. 36; Snow p. 57; Hall
Sec. 88; Lawrence Sec. 74-89; 1 Moore p.
73.)
The acceptance of the obligation "to re-
spect" the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of member states
means therefore a mutual engagement not
to interfere on grounds of humanity or to
assist an oppressed people or otherwise with-
in the territorial limits of member states. This
obligation would probably forbid extending a
recognition of belligerency to revolting peo-
ples within the territories of member states.
The second obligation in the first sentence
of Article 10 is that to preserve as against
external aggression the -territorial integrity
and existing political independence of mem-
her states; so that there is not only the duty
to abstain from giving any recognition or
assistance to a revolting portion of a mem-
ber state, but there exists the duty to aid in
putting down such revolt should some other
state assist the revolting portion.
It is plainly a renewal of the proposition of
the Holy Allies at the Congress of Aix-la-
Chapelle, 1818, to stereotype the state pos-
session, which was promptly rejected by Lord
Castlereagh as impossible of achievement un-
til existing wrongs had been righted... (Alli-
son's Life of Castlreagh, Vol. 5, p. 66.)
Article II. Any war or threat of war,
whether immediately affecting members or
not, is hereby declared a matter of con-
cern of the League, and the League shall
take any action deemed wise and effectual
to safeguard the peace of nations. In case
any such emergency should arise the Sec-
retary General shall on the request of any
member forthwith summon a meeting of
the Council.
What, it is pertinent to ask, constitutes
a threat of war? The extent and variety of
acts and situations embodying a threat of
war defy enumeration, It is impossible even
to catalogue acts and causes of war. One
instance of a threat of war, in that it is a
hostile act, may be cited: namely, any pre-
mature recognition of belligerency or of in-
dependence extended to a people struggling
to be free. (Hall, pp. 39-42; Woolsey, Sec.
180; Davis, 4th ed. pp, 277-278).
The term "threat of war" is absolutely un-
defined in the terminology of the law of na-
tions. It may be construed to embrace any
degree of friction in international negotia.
tion and authorized intervention by the
League.
It is the friendly right of each mem-
ber to bring to the attention of the As-
sembly or Council any circumstance
whatever affecting international relations
which threatens to disturb international
peace or good understanding.
It is presumed that the right of the As-
sembly or Council to obtrude itself into the
ordinary diplomatic negotiations between
states would not be needlessly exercised, yet
the right is apparently contemplated if the
negotiations do not move smoothly. The
possession of the untrammeled right of nego-
tiation is the test of independence. (Manning
pp. 93-100; Westlake, Chap. VII; I Halleck,
Ch. IV., Sec. 1.))
Article 12. Members agree that if there
should arise between them any dispute
likely to lead to a rupture, they will sub-
mit the matter either to arbitration or to
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inquiry by the Council, and they agree in
no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by arbitrators or
the report by the Council. In any case the
award by arbitrators shall be made within
a reasonable time and the report of the
Council shall be made within six months
after submission.
The obligation embodied in this Article
has been assumed generally by the civilized
sates of the world in bilateral treaties; and
since 1899 the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion at The Hague has been successfully oc-
cupiod with a great variety of disputes. It
is true that in a great majority of these bi-
lateral treaties, "questions of honor and vital
street," that S, poliwl quesdons, are
excepted and reserved. There are certain
political questions that are admittedly not
arbitrable, as, for example, with us, one in-
volving the validity of the Monroe Doctrine.
The principle of delay has been similarly
ambodied in bilateral treaties, providing for
eommissions of inquiry in place of reference
to arbitration, though it has not been ex-
yisiv* applied as yet, except by the United
States in the so-called Bryan treaties of 1913-
1914.
Article 13. Members agree that whenever a
dispute arises between them which they
recognize as suitable for submission to ar-
bitration, and which cannot be satisfactor-
ily settled by diplomacy, they will submit
the whole subject matter to arbitration.
Disputes as to interpretation of treaties,
as to questions of international law, as to
the existence of any fact which, if estab-
lished, would constitute a breach of inter-
national obligation or as to the extent and
nature of reparation to be made for such
breach are declared to be suitable for ar-
biiration. For the consideration of any
such dispute the Court of Arbitration to
which such case is referred shall be the
court agreed on or stipulated in any con-
vention between the parties. Members
agree to carry out the award in good faith,
and not to resort to war against a member
complying therewith. In the event of fail-
ure to carry out such award the Council
shall propose what steps should be taken
to give effect thereto.
This Article puts "teeth" in the conven-
tions of 1899 and 1907 establishing the Per-
mmaent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
This Court has heard and deternned many
gave controversies, but its determinations
%ave been founded. largely upon compromise
and expediency rather than upon the applI'
ation of the principles of law. It Was due
to an existing sense of the inadequacy of this
Court as a means for building up a body of
legal decisions that the American delegation
to The Hague Conference of 1907 was able
to bring about the adoption of a draft con-
vention for the institution of a Court of Ar-
bitral Justice. The matter of representation
alone prevented it from being put into imme-
diate operation, a difficulty easy of solution
today.
The convention establishing the Permanent
Court of Arbitration appears to be the only
one of the dozen or more of beneficient con-
ventions signed at The Hague in 1907 that is
recognized by the Principal Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers as possessing any binding force
or as worthy of survival. (See Article 287.,
There appears to be a distinct break with the
past twenty years' development of law and
judicial processes as the pre-eminently de-
sirable means toward the establishment of
peace, and an espousal of the doctrine of
force.
Article 14. Council shall formulate and
submit to members of the League for adop-
tion plans for a Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice.
The convention referred to (supra, oppo-
site Article 13) is ready at hand, having
been accepted by all the civilized states of
the world. (See Scott, The Hague Confer-
ences.)
Article 15. Members agree that any dispute
likely to lead to a rupture, not submitted
in accordance with Article 13, will be sub-
mitted to the Council. Any party may
effect submission by giving notice to the
Secretary General. The parties will com-
municate to the Secretary General state-
ments of their case with all relevant facts
and papers, and the Council may forthwith
direct the publication thereof.
The Council will endeavor to effect a
settlement, and if successful a statement
shall be made public, giving the facts and
explanations. If the dispute is not settled
the Council, either unanimously or by ma-
jority vote, shall publish a report and rec-
ommendations. Any member of the League
or Council may do likewise.
If the report of the Council is unani-
mously agreed to by members other than
the representatives of one or more parties
to the dispute, such members will not go
to war with any party complying with the
recommendation.
If the Council fails to reach a report
unanimously agreed to by members other
than those in dispute, members reserve the
right to take such action as they consider
necessary for the maintenance of right and
justice.
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This Article attempts to deal with disputes
other than those known as "justiciable," dealt
with in Article 13. It is realized that some
of these questions are beyond amicable solu-
tion. They are outside the realm of law and
no principle of law or possibility of compro-
mise can give hope of settlement. In such
circumstances the League apparently sanc-
tions a resort to war, after conciliation
through the medium of the Council has failed.
The principles embodied in Article 12, 13
and 1S are sound; the objection lies in the
methods of their application.
What provision is made, it may be asked,
for cases of self-defense against sudden at-
tack, as for example, a border raid? Must
the state assailed submit pasively until the
Council has deliberated upon the questipn of
"external aggression" or upon conciliation?
The right of self-defense appears nowhere to
be recognized in the sense that it has hereto-
for existed. (Hershey, 144-146, and notes.)
If the dispute between the parties is
claimed by one of them, and is found by
the Council, to arise out of a matter which
by international law is solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the
Council shall so report and make no rec-
ommendations.
It. will be observed that as to whether or
not a dispute arises out of a matter "which
by international law is solely within domes-
tic jurisdiction" is for the Council to find.
There is a great variety of things a state
may do in pursuance of its territorial su-
premacy, or domestic jurisdiction, which have
international effect, and which may or may
not infringe the rights of other states. Thus
all persons, including aliens, within the terri-
torial limits of a state are subject to the
jurisdiction of that state, yet the state to
which the alien owes allegiance may right-
fully protect him abroad and compel a stand-
ard of treatment recognized by International
Law. (See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection,
etc.) So all exercises of domestic jurisdiction
having international effect may be held to in-
volve international concern. Knowing that
"It is the duty of a good judge to extend his
jurisdiction," it is conceivable that much ex-
ercise of domestic jurisdiction having inter-
national effect might ultimately pass under
the control of the Council in the application
of this Article.
The Council may in any case refer the
question to the Assembly, and it shall be
referred to the Assembly at the request of
either party, if such request be made with-
in fourteen days after the submission of
the dispute to the Council. The Assembly
shall have all the powers of the Council
conferred in this Article and in Article 12,
provided that a report made by the As.
sembly be concurred in by members in
The Council and a majority of other mem-
bers of the League other than the parties
to the dispute.
The apparent concurrent power of the
Azsembly will be seen by this Article to have
disappeared, requiring the concurrence of
the Council to effectuate its action, thus leav.
ing the Council the preponderantly powerful
authority in the scheme.
Article 16. Should any member resort to
war in disregard of its covenants under
Articles 12, 13 and 15, it shall ipso facto
be deemed to have committed an act of
war against all other members of the
League, which hereby undertake to sub.
jedt it to the severance of all trade or
financial relations, the prohibition of all
intercourse between their nationals and
the nationals of the Covenant-breaking
state ancd the nationals of any other state.
It shall be the duty of the Council in
such case to recommend to the several
governments concerned what effective mil-
itary, naval or air force the members shall
severally contribute to the armed forces to
be used to protect the Covenants of the
League of Nations.
It is for the Council (or the Assembly with
the consent of the Council under Article 15)
to decide when the contingency arises under
which the duty of invoking and applying
measures of commercial warfare falls upon
members.
The terms "resort to war" must be held to
include defensive and offensive warlike vio-
lance, as well as war legally declared and war
in its material sense. (The Three Friends(1896) 166 U. S.) The obligations under
this paragraph are clear and definite.
The duty of commercial boycott appears
to arise ipso facto with a determination by
the Council as to a "resort to war"; the duty
to contribute armed forces appears to rest
on a decision of the League ad referendum.
Members of the League agree, further,
mutually to support one another in finan-
cial and economic measures in order to
minimize the loss and inconvenience re-
sulting, and that they will afford passage
of troops through their territories.
Whether or not a member contributes to
the armed forces he shall contribute his share
toward the financial burden assumed by
those states employing their forces against
the recalcitrant state, and become a passive
ally at least to the extent of permitting the
passage of troops across his territory. Such
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assistance constitutes war quite as fully as
though troops were furnished.
Any member of the League which has
violated any covenant may be declared no
longer a member by unanimous vote of
the Council excluding the vote of the meme-
ber in disfavor.
Article 17. This Article extends the force
of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive to non-mem-
bers of the League, who shall be invited to
accept the obligations of membership for
the purpose of the dispute.
Upon such invitation the Council shall
immediately institute an inquiry.
This paragraph clothes the Council with
jurisdiction over all matters affecting or held
to affect international relations arising in
non-member states, with or without the ap-
proval of such non-members. It necessarily
involves a denial of the heretofore accepted
principles of the equality and independence
of states.
There is no limit to the measures that may
he taken.
If both parties to the dispute be non-
members and decline to accept the obliga-
tions of membership, the Council may take
such measures and make such recommen-
dations as will prevent hostilities and re-
sult in settlement.
On the whole this Article reduces those
non-members desiring to retain sovereignty
and independence to the same condition of
wardship to the Council as is produced in the
eases of members other than the Prinipal
Allied and Associated Powers.
The power to be assumed by the Council
appears to be that of unlimited intervention.
Consent to the exercise of the power may be
inferred as to signatories, but it can not be
inferred as to non-signatory or non-member
dates. The principle of independence would
vanish from the law of nations under this
Article.
Article 18. Every treaty or international
engagement entered into hereafter by any
member shall be forthwith registered with
th Secretariat and published. No such
treaty shall be binding until so registered.
Article 19. The Assembly may from time
to time advise the reconsideration of
treaties which have become inapplicable.
Article 20. Members severally agree that
the covenant abrogates all obligations and
understandings inter se which are incon-
sistent with the terms thereof, and that
they will not hereafter enter into incon-
sistent engagements. Any member bound
by inconsistent obligations shall take im-
mediate steps to procure release therefrom.
The execution of this Article is left to the
conscience of the members; there is no pro-
vision for scrutiny into existing treaties of
alliance and other conventions serving special
aims, nor is there any criterion by which in-
consistency may be deterzbined to exist. Thus
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with respect to-
the special interests of those two states in
Asia, announces as an object the preserva-
tion of peace. It may be contended by the
High Contracting Parties that no incompati-
bility exists; that it is in fact a "regional un-
derstanding" for securing the maintenance of
peace. (See Article 21.)
It is clear that different standards will be
applied as between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on the one hand, and the
small states on the other.
Article 21. Nothing in this Covenant shall
be deemed to affect the validity of interna-
tional engagements, such as treaties of ar-
bitration, or regional understandings like
the Monroe Doctrine, for 4securing the
maintenance of peace.
In the first part of this sentence all bilateral
and multi-lateral treaties of arbitration are
recognized as possessing continuing binding
force. (See comment opposite Article 282-
287.)
As to the Monroe Doctrine, it is not a
regional understanding; it is a mere unilateral
declaration of state policy which has never
received the recognition of any state as a rule
of international law. It is, however, founded
upon the right of self-preservation, which
right is recognized by international law. (I
Phillimore, Sees. 210-220; 1 Twiss, Sees. 106-
108-110; 1 Halleck, Ch. TV, Sees. 1-7, 18-
27; Wheaton, Sec. 60; Woolsey, Sees. 17-37;
Davis p. 93.)
The term "regional understanding" is new
in diplomatic language and has no history
from which a definition may be drawn. It
would appear, however, to embrace a vast
field of bilateral and multilateral treaties, con-
ventions and agreements relating to geo--
graphical areas and to the various degrees of
existing territorial rights. The aggression of
all powerful states upon weaker ones, estab-
lishing protectorates, spheres of influence,
spheres of interest and hinterlands, and ex-
acting territory on lease, has been clothed
invariably in language emphasizing the anx-
iety of the aggressor for the maintenance of
peace and the extension of protectionf Such
is the language of diplomacy, and if accepted
literally, all such agreements, founded upon
force and fraud alone, are validated (See
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1 Westlake, 121-142, for discussion of minor
territorial rights.)
This Article evidences merely a continua-
tion of the stereotyping process, seeking to
bind down mighty natural forces that no hu-
man power can hold in check. As a perti-
nent illustration of regional understanding the
Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917 reorganizes
the "special interests" of Japan in China, on
the ground of contiguity; if the principle of
equality has any validity whatever China is
equally entitled to a recognition of special
interests in Japan upon the same ground.
These understandings are not like the Mon-
roe Doctrine, which harbors no aggressive
designs, but from the materialistic European
and Asiatic points of view, the Monroe Doc-
trine is in the same category.
Article 22. To those colonies and territories
which have ceased to be under the sover-
eignty of the states which formerly gov-
erned them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by them-
selves under the strenuous conditions bf
the modern world, there shall be applied
the principle that the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form a sacred
trust of civilization and that securities for
the performance of this trust should be em-
bodied in this covenant. The best method
of effecting this purpose is to entrust the
Jutelage of such peoples to advanced na-
tions, as mandatories on behalf of the
League.
These peoples are perfectly able to stand
alone if protected against despoilment and
degradation at the hands of aggressive power-
ful states.
The character of the mandate must dif-
fer according to the stage of development
of the people, the geographical situation of
the territory, its economic conditions and
other similar circumstances.
After the laudable sentiments of the pre-
ceding paragraphs this is intended to prepare
the reader for certain exceptions, made nec-
essary in view of the existence of definite ob-
ligations in secret treaties and arrangements
for the distribution of the spoils of war.
Certain communities of the former Turk-
ish empire have reached a stage of devel-
opment where their independence can be
provisionally recognized, subject to the ren-
dering of administrative advice and assist-
ance by a mandatory.
This refers to Asia Minor and conforms
to the age-long British policy of dominating
the road to India. The principal community
referred to is Hedjaz, which is thus created
as a vassal state of Great Britain.
Other peoples, especially those in Africa,
must be placed under a mandatory respon-
sible for administration, order, morals, the
prohibition of the slave-trade and liquor
traffic, and the prevention of military or-
ganization among the natives.
There are territories, such as Southwest
Africa and certain of the South Pacific
islands which, owing to sparseness of popu-
lation, remoteness from civilization or con-
tiguity to the territory of the mandatory,
can best be administered as integral por.
tions of its territory.
This is the paragraph that conceals but
conforms to secret arrangements for the dis-
position of German southwest African col-
onies to France and certain Pacific island
possessions to Japan.
It is a mere mandate for annexation.
In every case the mandatory shall render
to the Council an annual report in refer-
ence to the territory committed to his
charge.
The degree of authority, control or ad-
ministration to be exercised by the manda-
tory shall, if not previously agreed upon,
be explicitly defined by the Council.
With the possible exception of Belgium the
four Principal Allied Powers, who sit in the
Council, will alone retain possession of the
German colonies. They will, therefore, re-
port to themselves annually and define their
degrees of control, occupying the dual rela-
tion of principal and agent in this trust.
A permanent commission shall be con-
stituted to receive and examine annual re-
ports and advise as to the observance of
mandates.
Such a commission can not perform a ser.
ous function.
Article 23. Subject to and in accordance
with conventions existing or hereafter
agreed upon the members of the League:
(a) Will endeavor to maintain fair and
humane conditions of labor for men, wom-
'en and children in all countries;
(b) Will undertake to secure just treat-
ment of native inhabitants under their con-
trol;
(c) Will entrust the League with gen-
eral supervision over agreements relating
to traffic in women and children, and in
opium and other dangerous drugs;
(d) With supervision of trade in arms
in countries in which it may be necessary;
(e) Will make provisions to secure free-
dom of communications and transit and
equitable treatment for commerce of all
members;
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(f) Will endeavor to take steps for the
prevention and control of disease.
This program, when cosnidered in con-
nection with Articles 24 and 282 infra, re-
veals i magnitude of labors and a diversity
of administrative power, the logical develop-
ment of which would abolish all conceptions
of sovereignty and independence among na-
tions.
Article 24. There will be placed under the
direction of the League all existing inter-
national bureaux if the parties to such
treaties consent. All such bureaux here-
after established shall be placed under the
direction of the League.
The Council may include as part of the
expenses of the Secretariat the expenses
of any bureau or commission placed under
the League's direction.
(See Comment opposite Article 23, 282.)
Article 26. Amendments to this covenant
will take effect when ratified by members
whose representatives compose the Coun-
cil and by a majority of the members
whose representatives compose the Assem-
bly. No amendment shall bind a member
which signifies dissent, but in such case it
shall cease to be a member.
It will be observed that there are no limits
to the powers which the Council may assume
under this Article, nor are there any limita-
tions upon the powers of the Council in the
whole covenant comparable to ai internation-
al bill of rights.
The structure contemplates not an associa-
tion of equals, but the subordination of the
many to the authority of the few. The over-
ruling authority is not a diplomatic assembly
but a small group in which unequal repre-
sentation exists, combining and confusng
legislative, executive and judicial power. The
distinction may be clarified by a quotation
from Dr. James Brown Scott's The Hague
Peace Conferences, Vol. 1, pp. 35-36:
"It must not, however, be forgotten that
great-indeed radical and essential-dif-
ferences exist between a parliament and a
diplomatic assembly. A parliament legis-
lates for a nation, and by means of proper
representatives, it legislates for various
component parts of the nation. Interna-
tional conferences in which the nations of
the world are represented, recommend to
the nations represented, or legislate ad
referendum. A parliament presupposes
subordination; a conference equality. A
parliament binds the dependent; a con-
ference recommends to the equal and in-
dependent nations. The parliament, by
means of majorities, decrees or issues a
law; the conference, by means of unani-
mous agreement presents to the nations
represented, a dr&4 which, when ratified
by the nations, becomes by the approval of
the internal and constitutional organs, the
law of the ratifying nation. When ratified
by the nations as a whole it becomes jus
inter gentes, that is, international law in
the strict sense of the word. At most the
decree or resolution of a majority binds
the majority; it does not, and under exist-
ing conditions, it can not well control an
individual state."
Oppenheim, in his three lec.u-es on the
League of Nations (Supra, p. 36) in 1919,
declared it essential that the League start
from the beginning made by the two Hague
Conferences. This the Peace Conferenco
failed utterly to do.
Annex I. Original Members of the League
of Nations Signatories of the Treaty:
The United States of Nicaragna
America Panama
Belgium Peru
Bolivia Poland
Brazil China
British Empire Cuba
Canada Ecuador
Australia France
South Africa Greece
New Zealand Guatemala
India Portugal
Haiti Roumania
Hedjaz Serb, Croat, Slovene
Honduras State
Italy Siam
Japan Czecho-Slovakia
Liberia Uruguay
States invited to accede to the Covenant:
Argentine Republic Persia
Chili Salvador
Columbia Spain
Denmark Sweden
Netherlands Switzerland
Norway Venezuela
Paraguay
Annex II. First Secretary General of the
League of Nations:
The Honorable Sir James Eric Drum-
mond, K. C. M. G., C. B.
Part II. Boundaries of Germany.
Part III. Political Clauses for Europe.
SECTION L-BELGIUM.
Article 31. Germany recognizes and con-
sents to the abrogation of the Treaty of
Neutralization of April 19, 1839, and un-
dertakes to recognize and to observe any
conventions which may be entered into by
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the Principal Allied and Associated Pow-
ers or any of them, in lieu thereof.
The first part of this Article apparently
takes cognizance of the continuing force of
the principle enunciated by the London Con-
ference of 1871, to the effect that it is an
essential principle of the public law of Europe
that no state may release itself from the oh-
ligations of a multilateral law-making treaty,
or modify the terms thereof, except with the
consent of the other contracting parties, pre-
viously obtained.
The latter part of the Article looks to
some new arrangement whereby Belgium's
territorial situation is to remamn permanently
fixed as a buffer state on the west coast of
Europe, in which arrangement, however, it is
anticipated that the United States, as one of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,
may not take part.
Article 32. The condominum of Prussia
and Belgium over Moresnet neutre is
replaced by the passage of this territory
under the single sovereignity of Belgium.
This is in effect annexation of Moresnet
neutre by Belgium, with the consent of the
Powers.
This territory has been in dispute since
1815 because of lack of agreement as to the
boundary treaty of that date between the
Netherlands and Prussia.
The renunciation of the territory in favor
of Belgium excludes the possibility of a plebis-
cite, and it does not appear that the inhabi-
tants are given any right of option.
Articles 33-34 stipulate for the cession of
Prussian Moresnet ano Eupen and Malmedy
to Belgium, in which, within six months
the inhabitants may indicate in writing a
desire to see the whole or a part of the
territory remain under German sovereign-
ity. The League of Nations will decide as
to any action taken.
Anciently and until the close of the 18th
century it was the universal practice of suc-
cessful belligerents, in cases of conquest and
forced cession, to subject the inhabitants in
such conquered or ceded territory forthwith
to the new allegiance, regardless of their
wishes or preferences. It is no longer per-
missible, however, to hand such populations
around, in view of the development of politi-
cal principles which recognize the sovereign-
ty of the people as the governing factor in
the political and social life of civilized states.
This development has given rise to the plebis-
cite, under which the people may indicate en
masse their wishes as to the disposition of the
territory. (Funck-Brentano et Sorel (1887),
157 f. and 335 ff.; I Rivier, 210.)
Although the plebiscite was invoked as
early as 1552 by Henry 11 of France, after
the capture of Toul, Metz and Verdun, its
fixed position in international practice begins
in the French revolutionary period. Incon-
sistent though it may seem, the United States
has evinced little approval of the doctrine in
its own practice.
In the Articles of the treaty referred to it
must be assumed that the final disposition of
the territories ceded to Belgium will be in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the
inhabitants, though no pledge is given that
such will be the case, nor is the disposing
authority expressly bound to observe such
wishes.
Article 35. Provision is made herein for the
appointment, within fifteen days after the
coming into force of the treaty, of a com-
mission to delimit the boundaries of the
German territories going to Belgium.
If the final disposition of these territories
is to depend upon plebiscites it seems need-
less to have provided for a formal delimita-
tion of boundaries in advance.
Article 36. With the actual transfer of sov-
ereignty "over the territories referred to
above"-that is, upon the coming into
force of the treaty by ratification-"Ger-
man nationals habitually resident in the
territories will definitely acquire Belgian
nationality, ipso facto, and will lose their
German nationality. But German nationals
who became residents in the territories
after August 1, 1914, shall not obtain Bel-
gian nationality without a permit from the
Belgian government.
Complementary to the right of plebiscite in
the mass of a population, looking to the pro-
tection of the political rights of a people with
respect to their territory, there has developed
for the protection of the minority in ase of
transfer of territory, the so-called right of op-
tion, under which the individual may retain
his old allegiance, if he so desires, by the
formal recording of that election. (3 Moore,
Digest, Sees. 379-380; Boyd vs. Thayer, 143
U. S. 135.)
The Article opposite contains the remark-
able provision that German nationals habitual-
ly resident in the ceded territory will become
Belgian nationals immediately upon the actual
transfer of sovereignty to Belgium, and will
lose their German nationality. Since allegi-
ance to Germany thus ceases Germany's right
and obligation to protect them likewise
ceases. That is one of the practical effects.
Article 37. However, within two years Ger-
man nationals over 18 years of age, in
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such territories will be entitled to opt for
German nationality, option by the husband
including the wife, and by the parents, in-
cluding their children under 18 years of
a ge.
Persons thus opting "must within the
ensuing twelve months transfer their place
of residence to Germany."
They may retain their immovable prop-
erty in the territories and may carry with
them their movable property free from ex-
port or import taxes, with respect to such
property.
It appears that German nationals who have
become involuntary Belgian nationals may ex-
ercise the option to divest themselves of Bel-
gian nationality within two years after the
coming into force of the treaty and become
German nationals again, the German nation-
ality laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
There is a provision of the German laws
which declares that a German national ac-
quiring allegiance elsewhere automaticaly
forfeits his German nrttionality. It is difficult
to understand how one who has forfeited a
particular nationality may opt for it; -et since
the acquisition of new nationality by Germans
in this case is involuntary, it may properly be
viewed as void from the standpoint of Ger-
man domestic law.
As has been pointed out (supra opposite
Article 30) the inhabitants of conquered or
ceded territory may not be compelled to ac-
cept the new allegiance against their will.
Nationality is a judicial status and is essen-
tially voluntary. We have contended for the
principle in various manifestations from the
foundation of this government, until at length
it has become fixed in the law of nations.
(3 Moore's Digest, Sec. 439; Scott, Cases
375.)
To force a new allegiance even upon the
outcast German, and merely temporarily, as
in this case, is none the less a violation of
the law of nations.
Even the Congress of Vienna, that reac-
tionary gathering which divided the spoils of
Europe in 1i15, did not attempt such a thing.
On the contrary in Article VII of the Treaty
of Paris of 1815, it is declared that in all
countries which shall change sovereigns, a
period of six years shall be allowed to the
inhabitants, of whatsoever condition or na-
tionality, "to dispose of their property, if
they should think fit to do so, and to retire
to whatever country they may choose."
The present treaty requires those opting
for German nationality, within the ensuing
twelve months, to "transfer their place of
residence to Germany," which appears to
mean that they shall quit the soil of Belgium
physically and return to Germany... Whether
they can emigrate to the United States or to
some other place is doubtful, at least before
they have transferred their residence to Ger-
many.
The provision with respect to their immov-
able property appears to accord with enlight-
ened practice.
Article 39. Belgium will assume a portion
of the public debt on account of such ter-
ritories to be calculated on the basis.
(a) Of the ratio of the average for the
three years of 1911, 1912 and 1913 of
revenues of the ceded territories and the
average for the same years of the revenues
of the German empire, or
(b) Of the same ratio in its application
to the German state to which such ceded
territory belonged as of August 1, 1914.
to be determined by the Reparation Com-
mission.
In cases of conquest or cession, such as
this, the rule is embraced in the maxim, res
transit cum suo onere; that is to say, the
conquerer succeeding to the rights must also
assume the burdens running with the terri-
tory. However, there are exceptions in prac-
tice. As to the public debt he need not share
in that portion imposed for the prosecution
of the war; and the calculation of the debt
to be assumed by Belgium properly refers to
the pre-war period. The portion to be as-
sumed conforms to enlightened practice.
Nothing is said, however, concerning other
contractual obligations running with the ter-
ritory, and it must be inferred that these are
assumed subject to the law with respect to
same. (1 Moore, p. 334; 1 Westlake, p. 75;
Scott, Cases, 85.)
However, Belgium shall acquire all prop-
erty and possessions situated in such terri-
tory, belonging to the German empire and
states, including the private property of
the former German emperor and other
royal personages, free from any obligation
to make compensation or to allow credit
for same in the financial statement.
An invasion of the law of inviolability of
private property occurs in the Article in ques-
tion and that relates to the taking over by
Belgium of the private property of the former
German emperor and other royal personages,
along with public property. A century ago
no distinction was made between the private
property of the sovereign and the domains of
the state. Napoleon, for example, appropri-
ated the private property of the Elector of
Hesse-Cassel.
Though the property of a monarch is
assimilated to that of the state, and as such
devolves on the successor, the private prop-
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erty of a sovereign or other head of the
state in his personal capacity, is under the
protection of the principle of the inviolabil-
ity of private property quite as fully as that
of the individual subjects. (Phillipson, Ter-
mination of War, etc., p. 321.)
SECTION II.-LUXEMBURG.
Articles 40-41. Germany renounces the
benefit of various treaties with Luxemburg
and recognizes its withdrawal from the
German Zollverein; agrees to the termina-
tion of the regime of neutrality and ac-
cepts in advance any arrangements to be
made by the Allied and Associated Powers
continuing the Grand Duchy as a buffer
state. Germany also recognizes the Grand
Duchy as sharing in the commercial ad-
vantages to be enjoyed by the Allied and
Associated Powers.
This is a purely political arrangement, de-
signed to take Luxemburg from under the
influence of Germany's commercial and polit-
ical system.
SECTION I1.-LEFT BANK OF THE
RHIN.
Articles 42-44. Fortifications either on the
left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank
to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers
to the east of the Rhine is forbidden, as
are military manoevres and the assembly
of armed forces in such area.
Violation of these terms shall be regard-
ed as a hostile act against the Powers
signatory of the treaty, and as calculated
to disturb the peace of the world.
In this arrangement, looking to the pre-
vention of Germany ever again possessing a
strategic frontier against France, it will he
observed that all states signatory of the
treaty, including those neutral in the Great
War, should they ratify it, are to be bound
by this provision. It is in effect the neutral-
ization of such portion of Germany under a
world garantee.
SECTION IV.-SAAR BASIN.
Article 45. As compensation for the de-
struction of coal mines in the north of
France and as reparation Germany cedes
to. France in full and absolute possession,
with exclusive rights of exploitation, un-
emcumbered and free from all debts and
charges, the coal mines of the Saar Basin.
It will be for Germany to indemnify the
proprietors.
This Article disregards, utterly the rights
of private property to the extent that the
Sam Basin mines are privately owned, and is
in effect an act of confiscation in violation of
the spirit of law. (See Comment, Article
74.)
Article 46. The extent of France's rights in
the Saar Basin mines is set out by refer-
ence to Chapter I of an Annex. French
ownership is extended to deposits for
which concessions may or may not have
been granted, whether private or public
property, with the right of working, not
working or transferring the right to work
the mines; all accessories and subsidiaries,
including plant and equipment, by-prod-
uct plants, electric lines, buildings, dwell-
ings, schools, hospitals, and all other prop-
erty enjoyed by the present owners, go
with the mines to France, free from all
debts and charges. Germany must pay
over any sums due employes on account
of pensions for old age or disability.
Workmen of French nationality may be
introduced into the region and they shall
have the right to belong to labor unions.
France shall have the right to establish
and maintain schools for its employes, and
of giving instruction in the French lan-
guage. It may also maintain hospitals, dis-
pensaries, and other charitable and social
institutions.
France shall enjoy complete liberty with
respect to the distribution, dispatch and
sale prices of the products of the mines.
It does not appear that German workmen
have a right to belong to labor unions.
The government of the Saar Basin is
provided for in Chepter II of an Annex
referred to in Aricle 46. It will be en-
trusted to a Governing Commission of five
members chosen by the Council of the
League of Nations, to include a citizen of
France, a native of the Sanr Basin who is
not a citizen of France, and three mem-
bers belonging to three countries other
than France or Germany; appointed annu-
ally. One of the five will be designated
as Chairman and he will act as the Execu-
tive.
The Commission shall have all the pow-
ers hitherto belonging to the German Em-
pire, Prussia and Bavaria in such region,
and shall be charged with the protection
abroad of the interests of the inhabitants.
Nevertheless it is declared the existing na-
tionality of the inhabitants remain un-
affected, unless they choose to acquire a
different nationality.
What, it may be asked, is the political
status of German nationals under the Gov-
erning Commission? Their nationality is
said to be unaffected, yet nationality implies
allegiance and allegiance involves the right
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and duty of protection. (Hershey, Essentials
of Pub. Int. Law, p. 236.) The protection
of German nationals is given over to the
Governing Commission. Germany may not
exert herself anywhere in their behalf. No
hindrance is placed in their way against de.
parting from the country or acquiring a
new nationality; in fact, these clauses, includ-
iag ample safeguards with respect to their
private property, are of customary liberality.
The inhabitants may elect local assem-
blies, every inhabitant over the age of 20
years having the right to vote, without
distinction of sex. Such inhabitants as
may desire to leave the territory may do
so without restriction as to property.
The Governing Commission is supreme
in interpreting the scheme under which it
is instituted, the decisions to be taken by
majority.
The inhabitants may elect local assemblies,
but it is nowhere set out what the dgree of
influence such assemblies will have in the
ordering of the domestic concerns.
Article 47. The ultimate fate of the Sear
Basin is here dealt with by reference to
Chapter III of an Annex. In this chapter
it is set out that at the termination of
a period of fifteen years the population of
the Sear Basin may have a plebiscite, the
vote to be taken by communes or districts
on the three following propositions:
(a) Maintenance of the regime of the
Governing Commission; (b) Union with
France; (c) Union with Germany.
All persons without distinction of sex,
more than 20 years of age, resident in the
territory at the date of the signature of
the present treaty, will have the right to
vote. Other conditions may be made by
the League of Nations. The League shall
decide on the ultimate sovereignty, tak-
ing into account the wishes of the inhabi-
tants thus expressed. If the League de-
cides in favor of Germany in whole or in
part, the rights of France shall be re-pur-
chased in gold, the price to be fixed by
a commission of three, one of whom shall
be nominated by France, the second by
Germany, and the third by the League of
Nations, who shall be neither a Frenchman
nor a German. The League of Nations
will take all decisions by majority.
It is not quite plain why the "repurchase"
of the Saar Basin by Germany should have
been made contingent upon a plebiscite.
The population is overwhelmingly German,
and since the qualified voters are those only
over 20 years of age who were "resident in
the territory at the date of the signatume of
the present treaty," that is, June 28, 1919,
no amount of colonization by France can
overcome that fact.
The question arises, however, may those
who have meantime removed from the Saar
Basin back to Germany, enjoy the privileges
of taking part in the plebiscite? They would
seem to be qualified if more than 20 years
of age, since the provision designates "all
persons," etc., yet it is not dear.
The League shall decide, "talkng into ac-
count the wishes of the inhabitants as ex-
pressed by the voting," with respect to the
final disposition of the territory. There is
no obligation to respect the results of the
plebiscites; it is merely to be taken into
account along with other things.
Nothing is said of the rights of German
labor. France, as the one big employer in
the territory, dominating practically every
business and enterprise, is free wholly to sub-
stitute French for German labor, through
which the entire German population might
be compelled to emigrate. In such a con-
tingency it might then become important to
settle whether absentees, who were resident
in the Sar Basin in 1919, had the right to
take part in the plebiscite.
Article 48. This deals with the fixing of
boundaries of the Saar Basin.
Article 49. Germany renounces in favor of
the League of Nations, in the capacity of
trustee, the government of the territory
defined above.
A unique question of sovereignty arises
from this Article. It is stlted that Germany
renounces in favor of the League of Nations
as trustee only the government of the Saar
Basin, and it is contemplated that German
sovereignty subsists, since provision is made
for "renunciation of sovereignty or cession"
by Germany ultimately, in the event the
League of Nations decides to award the whole
or a part of the territory to France.
Yet the political or governmental author-
ity over a territory is the very essence of
sovereignty, and by the provisions of Chap-
ters U and III this authority, internal as well
as external, is vested in the Governing Com-
mission. It is even charged with the pro-
toction abroad of German nationals, inhabi-
tents of the territories. It may thus be con-
tended that Germany has parted with sover-
eignty over the Sear Basin. If such a con-
dition as the suspension of sovereignty is a
legal possibility it may be that such occurs
in the Saar Basin. (1 Moore, pp. 252-254.)
In whatever terms the treaty seeks to de-
scribe the transaction, however, it apepars to
be a simple case of disguised cession, on all
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fours with the so-called leased territory of
the European powers and Japan in China,
the restoration of such territories depending
upon certain and uncertain contingencies.
The Saar Basin case differs, of course, in the
fact that a third state, and not the cessionary
is given exclusive rights of exploitation. (I
Westlake, 133-139; Hershey, pp. 184-185.)
SECTION V.-ALSACE-LORRAINE-
The High Contracting Parties recogniz-
ing the moral obligation to redress the
wrong done by Germany in 1871, both to
the rights of France and to the wishes of
the population of Alsace-Lorraine, which
were separated from their country in spite
of the solemn protest of their representa-
tives at the Assembly of Bordeaux, agree
upon the following Articles:
Article 51. The territories of Alsace and
Lorraine are retroceded to France.
As set out in the preamble the taking of
Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871, con-
stituted a moral, not a legal wrong; that is
to say, title to the territory of another state
founded in conquest is quite as legal and un-
impeachable as if founded upon voluntary
cession. It is a principle that violates our
modern sense of justice, but it is nevertheless
a settled one.
It is to the credit of the High Contracting
Parties that they recognized the moral obli-
gation to redress this wrong, both to the
rights of France as sovereign over the terri-
tory, and to the wishes of the people. If
this measure were applied universally the
moral principle would thereby attain the po-
sition of a legal one, since he basis of all
law is universal acquiescence or assent. The
High Contracting Parties have not only failed
to seize the opportunity to legalize the prin-
ciple against conquest and the rights of
peoples to choose their own way of obedience
by the universal application of these princi-
ples, but they have destroyed and nullified
the force of this instance of its application in
settlements which repudiate these principles
(see Part IV, Sec. 8, Articles 156-158); nor
is any intimation given in the treaty that ex-
isting instances of the subjection of peoples
to alien governments against the will of such
peoples constitutes a moral wrong. (See Sec.
VI, Article 147.)
Article 53. The political status of the in-
habitants of Alsace-Lorraine is fixed in this
Article by reference to an Annex which
makes the following decisions:
As from November 11, 1819, the follow-
ing persons are ipso facto reinstated in
French nationality:
(1) Persons who lost French nationality
under the treaty of 1871 and acquired
German nationality.
(2) The legitimate descendants of
those referred to above, except those whose
descendants in the paternal line include a
German who emigrdted into Alsace-Lor-
raine after July 15, 1870.
(3) All persons born in Alsace-Lor-
raine of unknown parents or whose na-
tionality is unknown.
It will be observed that the treaty here
attempts to determine the French nationality
of the inhabitants without in any way con-
sulting their wishes. It institutes three broad
classes of persons whose nationality is
changed arbitrarily. Those in the classes
have nothing to say in the matter.
The first class "reinstated" in French na-
tionality includes all those who, upon the ces-
sion of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871,
declined to avail themselves of the right to
opt for French nationality under Article U
of the Treaty of Frankfort, but chose to re-
main and acquire German nationality.
It is conceivable that many of this class
are satisfied with their acquired German na-
tionality and are thus involuntarily trans-
ferred to a new allegiance.
And so in the second class, the descend-
ants of the first class, it is probable that many
will not willingly renounce their' German
allegiance.
These persons are denied the right to opt
for German nationality.
The Annex also sets out the following
classes as eligible to opt for French nation-
ality:
(1) All persons whose ascendants in-
clude a Frenchman or a French woman
who failed to opt for French nationality in
1871.
(2) All foreigners, not German nation-
als, who become citizens of Alsace Lor-
raine prior to August 3, 1914.
(3) All Germans domiciled in Alsace-
Lorraine since July 15, 1870, or who had
an ascendant so domiciled.
(4) All Germans, domiciled or born in
Alsace-Lorraine. who served in the Allied
or Associated armies.
(5) All persons born in Alsace-Lor-
raine before May 10, 1870, of foreign par-
ents and the descendants of such persons.
(6) The husband or wife of any per-
son whose French nationality may have
been restored in the three classes referred
to above, or who may have claimed and
obtained French nationality in accordance
with the preceding provisions.
The rule that the nationality of the wife
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and children follow that of the husband and
rather is apparently ignored. The anomalous
situation is thus made possible that a French
national, residing in French territory, may
have a wife who is an alien to him and to
her own children.
Subject to the above exceptions no Ger-
mans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine
shall acquire French nationality, even
though they are citizens of Alsace-Lor-
raine, except by the normal process of nat-
uralization, on condition of having been
domiciled from a date previous to August
3, 1914, and of submitting proof of three
years" unbroken residence.
The treaty, while arbitrarily restricting the
right of option to limited classes and to a
particular nationality (French) does not
attempt to set aside the principle of naturali-
zation.
France will be solely responsible for
their diplomatic and consular protection
from the date of application for natural-
ization.
The practice of enlightened states, which
may be said to conform to the law, in respect
of protection abroad of declarant aliens, is
that such protection is asserted to the ful
extent in countries other than those of origin.
As against their native countries no such
rights are claimed in view of the continuing
allegiance of such declarants up to the mo-
ment of complete acquirement of a new na-
tionality. The rule rests upon a sound and
logical fovndation. (3 Moore, pp. 893, 895.)
However France proposes to override it as
against Germany, in behalf of German na-
tionals who have declared their intention to
become French citizens. It is safe to say that
the position can only be maintained by a
stronger as against a weaker state.
Considering the nationality provisions gen-
erally with respect to Alsace-Lorraine, it ;,Ul
be seen that a plebiscite has not been consid-
ered, although Germans may predominate in
the territories; nor is option freely granted.
Large classes of persons are made French
citizens by the fiat of the treaty and other
restricted classes are declared eligible Vo
claim French citizenship. None is declared
capable of choosing any other nationality.
Those in whom German nationality continues
are marked out by the treaty with equal
definitenes.
The utter absence of observance of the
doctrines of plebiscites and option, and of
uniformity in dealing with like situation may
be seen by comparison with Articles 36-37,
whereby German nationals resident in the
territories ceded to Belgium acquire Belgian
nationality ipso facto, and lose their German
nationality; however, within two years Ger-
man nationals there may opt for German na-
tionality.
Article 55. This deals with the public debt
of Alsace-Lorraine by reference to Article
255, Part IX of the treaty, which sets out
that since Germany refused to assume any
of the public debt of Alsace-Lorraine in
1871 France shall receive the territories
free and quit of all public debts, nor shall
any credit be given for same on the repa-
ration account.
In principle, therefore, there is no differ-
ence between the conquest and the recon-
quest, so far as the conduct of the victors is
concerned. Each takes all it can get over
and above the reparation account.
Article 56. In conformity with the provi-
sions of Article 256, Part IX, France shall
enter into possession of all property and
estate in the territories belonging to the
German empire, the German states, as well
as the Crown property and the private
property of the former German emperor
and other German sovereigns, without any
payment or credit on account of same.
See Comment, Article 39.
Article 58. Provision is made for "repay-
ment in marks of the exceptional war ex-
penditure advanced during the course of
the war by Alsace-Lorraine, or by public
bodies in Alsace-Lorraine on account of
the empire in accordance with German
law, such as payment to the families of
persons mobilized, requisitions, billeting
of troops and assistance to persons who
have been evacuated."
Thus France not only does not assume any
portion of the German debt in connection
with Alsace-Lorraine, but there is to be re-
paid the sums Alsace-Lorraine, in common
with all parts of the empire, was called on to
expend as indicated.
Article 59. France will collect on its own
account Imperial taxes of every kind levi-
able and not collected at the time of the
armistice, November 1 1, 1918.
Article 60. Germany shall restore without
delay to Alsace-Lorrainers all property,
rights and interests belonging to them on
November II, 1918, situated in German
territory.
Article 62. Germany undertakes to bear
the expense of all military and civil pen-
sions earned in Alsace-Lorraine on Novem-
ber i, 1918, and to pay annually the
sums to which persons resident in Alsace-
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Lorraine would have been entitled under
German rule.
Article 63. Germany's liability for injury
and damage is declared by reference to
Part VIII (Reparation), as follows:
'-he Allied and Associated Govern-
ments affirm and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Germany and her allies for
causing all the loss and damage to which
the Allied and Associated Governments
and their nationals have been subjected as
a consequence of the war imposed upon
them by the aggression of Germany and
her allies."
The Allied and Associated Governments
require and Germany undertakes to make
compensation for all damage done to the
civilian population of the Allied and Asso-
ciated Governments and to their property
during the period of the belligerency of
each by such aggression by land, by sea
and from the air, and in general, all dam-
age as defined in Annex 1, hereto.
Damages have been calculated on the
premise that since Germany was the aggres-
sor, she precipitated and carried on an un-
lawful war, and should therefore be responsi-
ble for all damage of whatsoever kind,
whether resulting from the operations of her-
self and her allies, or from the measures of
the Allied and Associated Governments.
While it is within the power of a successful
belligerent to impose any terms he wishes'the
law of nations nowhere makes any distinc-
tion between a just and an unjust war, nor
between a lawful and an unlawful war. In
view of the law, since each sovereign nation
may alone determine the demands of its wel-
ware and interest, it is the right of each to
determine when its exigencies require a
resort to war. Since 1899 (The Hague, Con-
vention No. 4) a distinction has been made
between a war lawfully declared and one not
thus declared.
From a moral standpoint a war may be
unjust and unrighteous, as that precipitated
by Germany unquestionably was, but it can
not be unlawful, since it is the supreme and
final apepal of all states in the protection of
their well-being.
It has been argued, and not without force,
that by reason of the obligations assumed by
Germany toward Belgium under the treaty of
Neutralization of April 19, 1839, it became
legally impossible for Germany to carry on
war against Belgium; and that Germany may
not therefore claim the benefits of the laws
of war odinarily obtaining; that is to say, in
the case of Belgium, Germany is not entitled
to deny responsibility for such destruction,
fines, contributions, requisitions and othor
warlike acts as are within the compass of the
lawful rights of belligerents.
Taking into consideration this exception
there is no principle of public international
law that enlarges the legal responsibility of
one of the belligerents because it was the
aggressor. In fact it is generally impossible
to determine with accuracy whether or not
a particular state was or was not the aggres-
sor. It is clear in the Franco-Prussian war
of 1870-71, in the Anglo.Boer war of 1900
and in the Turco-Italian war of 1912, but no
one has yet determined whether Russia or
Japan was the aggressor in 1904. (See The
Peace Problem (1916) John Bauett Moore.)
In order to avoid as far as possible the
evils of society it is agreed, says Vattel, to
regard every lawfully declared war as just on
both sides. (Halleck, International Law, 4th
ed., Vol. 1, p. 571.)
This statement of the law has undergone
no change up to the present. Out of this
view has necessarily sprung the law of neu-
trality.
War brings into operation a great variety
of laws defining rights and duties of bellig-
erents and neutrals, and among its rights
accruing to a belligerent is that to inflict any
damage upon his enemy, which has a inili-
tary object. There are certain specific limi-
tations upon a belligerent's means of injur-
ing his enemy, both at sea and on land, de-
signed to prohibit needless and wanton injury
and damage. However, it may be asserted
as a general principle of the laws of war that
all damage and injury inflicted in pursuit of a
military object are lawful. (Lawrence, 4th
ed., Sec. 206, p. 549; Spaight, 112).
The Annex then declares:
"Compensation may be claimed from
Germany under Article 232 above in
respect of the total damage under the fol-
lowing categories:
(1) Damage done to injured persons
and to surviving dependents by personal
injury to or death of civilians caused by
acts of war, including bombardments or
other attacks on land, on sea or from the
air, and all direct consequences thereof,
and of all operations of war by the two
groups of belligerents wherever arising.
Civilians are under the protection of the
laws of war, but their immunity from direct
and intentional injury is dependent upon
peaceable and non-hostile conduct. It is one
of the marked moral achievements of the
last century that the great divisions of popu-
lations of belligerent states into combatants
and non-combatants, with definite law regu-
lating their rights and duties, have been
made.
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Whence, civilians, taking no part in hos-
tilities may not lawfully be made the object
of direct injury. Nevertheless their injury or
killing as a mere incident to the carrying out
of a lawful military operation involves no
responsibility. For example, enemy munition
plants are lawful objects of attach If in such
attacks death should ensue to au or the em-
ployees, men, women and children, no lia-
bility whatever would rest upon the govern-
ment of the attacking force. So, too, the in.
cidental deaths of civilians in cases of bom-
bardment of defended towns, villages, build-
ings and places involve no liability. (Holland,
p. 30; Spaight, pp. 140-180).
It has never been settled what constitutes
a "defended" place; but it has been con-
tended by eminent authority (Westlake, Col-
lected Papers) that the presence of a single
soldier or company of soldiers might be suf-
ficient to constitute a defended place. If this
be so, it may be said that in the present great
war hardly a city, town or village in any of
the belligerent states was undefended, so
great were the proportions of the populations
taken into the armies.
As to the immunity of non-combatants, it
may be asked, to what degree, if any, was
this immunity compromised in the present
Great War in view of the universal mobili.
zation of man, woman and child-power be-
hind the armies of the respective belliger-
ents?
The following principles of law are settled:
(a) That acts of war, including bombard-
monts and other attacks on land and from the
ar, involve no legal liability whatever so long
as they have a military object and are not
directed against an undefended place.
(b) That attacks at sea against public
armed enemy vessels involve no liability; that
attacks upon unarmed merchantmen, not
guilty of flight or resistance, are illegal and
do involve liability. But even where flight or
resistance has been overcome there is a legal
obligation to provide for the safety of crew
and passengers.
The placing upon a vanquished belligerent
of responsibility for all damage and injury
resulting from the operations of the victor is
a mere exercise of power in the nature of
indemnity; it can not be construed as repara-
tion.
(2) Damage caused by Germany and
her allies to civilian victims of acts of
cruelty, violence and maltreatment (in-
cluding injuries to life or health as a con-
sequence of imprisonment, deportation, in-
ternment or evacuation, or exposure at sea
or of being forced to labor) wherever
arising, and to the surviving dependents of
such victims.
(2) Damage by Germany and her allies
caused to civilian victims by acts of cruelty,
violence or maltreatment, may properly give
rise to legal responsibility, where such acts
of cruelty, violence or maltreatment were not
permissible-and many of such are-under
the laws of war. For example, the right of
reprisal upon a rebellious population in a
militarily occupied district, may lawfully in-
volve extreme violence, even to the shooting
of civilians and the destruction of whole
towns. (Spaight, 465-470.)
It is the right of a belligerent state to im.
prison, intern and deport enemy civilians,
particularly male persons of military age, and
to use reasonable disciplinary measures
against them for cause.
Legal responsibility properly lies in the
matter of exposure at sea in view of the set-
tled principle requiring provision for the safe-
ty of crew and passengers of a captured
vessel.
(3) Damage caused by Germany or her
allies in their own territory or in occupied
or invaded territory to civilian victims, of
all acts injurious to health or capacity to
work or to honor, as well as to surviving
dependents of such victims.
As to acts injurious to health or capacity
to work such conditions might follow the
exercise of lawful violence, as reprisals
against a disobedient or resisting population
in a militarily occupied territory. Family
honor is clearly under the inviolable protec-
tion of the laws of war. (The Hague, 1907,
Convention 4, Art. 46).
(4) Damage caused by ainy kind of mal-
treatment of prisoners of war.
<4) There is no legal liability in cases of
damage resulting from reasonable disciplin-
ary measures in which the victim was culpa-
ble.
(5) As damage caused to the peoples of
the Allied and Associated Powers all pen-
sions and compensation in nature of pen-
sions to naval and military victims of the
war, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or
invalided, and to the dependents of such
victims.
(5) This is a mere exercise of power by
the victor over the vanquished in the nature
of indemnity.
(6) The cost of assistance by the gov-
ernments of the Allied and Associated
Powers to prisoners of war and their fam-
ilies and dependents.
It is customary among belligerents to com-
pute the respective costs of maintenance of
prisoners of war, including salaries allowed
officers, and to settle any balance at the
peace.
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The provision is in the nature of indem-
nity where it exceeds this custom.
(7) Allowance by the governments of
the Allied and Associated Powers to the
families and dependents of mobilized per-
sons and persons serving with the armed
forces.
This is a mere exercise of power in the
nature of indemnity.
(8) Damage caused to civilians by be-
ing forced by Germany or her allies to
labor without just compensation.
(8) The services of civilians in militarily
occuped territory may be requisitioned, nor
does the law require more than that a receipt
for such services shall be given. The receipt
does not imply liability on the part of the
giver to redeem it. (2 Westlake, 270; Bord-
well, 319; Spaight, 402-405.)
(9) Damage in respect of all property
wherever situated belonging to any of .he
Allied or Associated Powers or their na-
tionals, with the exception of naval and
military works or materials, which have
been carried off, seized, injured or de-
stroyed by acts of Germany or her allies
on land, on sea or from the air, or damage
directly in consequence of hostilities or of
any operations.
This provision ignores the whole body of
settled law with respect to allowable dam-
age and destruction. Such legal destruction
includes:
(a)AI destruction of naval and military
works, including shops, railroads and equip-
ment, munition plants, barracks and all build-
ings used by armed forces (other than hos-
pitals).
(b) Destruction of private property inci-
dental to bombardment.
(c) Destruction of property of military
value to prevent it falling into the hands of
the enemy.
(d) Destruction of property to facilitate
an attack or to impede pursuit.
To summarize, it may be said that all de-
struction which serves a military end, and is
not purely wanton, is lawful. (Spaight, 111 et
seq., 418.)
As to property carried off or seized, the
law makes a distinction between public mov-
ables, that is, government-owned property,
and private property. The former is con-
fiscable under the laws of war the latter is
not. (Spaight, 411, 412; 2 Westlake, 103-
104; Bonfils Nos. 1191-1193).
Yet even private property may be seized
and converted by a belligerent if it is
noxious, that is to say, if it is of a character
lending itself peculiarly to warlike use; so,
too, private property may be taken under the
right of requisition. (Spaight, 199-200).
(10) Damage in the form of levies.
fines and other similar exactions imposed
by Germany or her allies upon the civilian
population.
(10) Levies (contributions and requisi-
tions) and fines are lawful measures of war.
Levies in service, in supplies and in cash are
lawful if undertaken for the needs of the
army, or in lieu of or in addition to taxes,
for the support of the administration of occu-
pied territory, provided that they are in pro-
portion to the resources of the territory; and
provided further that they are not levied for
mere purposes of plunder.
Fines are a lawful measure against the dis-
obedience of a population in a militarily occu-
pied territory, if responsibility for disobedi-
ence be collective. It is the mildest manifes-
tation of the right of reprisal. (Spaight, 383,
408-410.)
Article 64. Regulations concerning the con-
trol of the Rhine and the Moselle are laid
down by reference to Part XII of the
treaty. Part XII, Chapter IV, provides
among other things that Germany shall
cede to France tugs and vessels registered
in German Rhine ports, including fittings
and gear, installations, berthing and an-
chorage accommodations, docks, ware-
houses, plants, etc., whether publicly or
privately owned, in an amount to be de-
cided by an arbitrator to be apopinted by
the United States, "due regard being had to
the needs of the parties concerned." The
value of such property shall be set off
against the total sums due from Germany.
This is purely an economic advantage in
the nature of indemnity. It is repugnant to
the spirit of the law at least to the extent
that private property exists in such tugs, ves-
sels, etc. (See Comment, infra, Article 74.)
Article 65. This Article gives to France
certain economic advantages in the ports
of Strasburg and Kehl under the Central
Rhine Commission, to be presided over by
a Frenchman.
This is in the nature of indemnity.
Articles 66-67. Railway and other bridges
across the Rhine within the limits of Al-
sace-Lorraine throughout their length be-
come French property, as do all Imperial
railways and tram concessions, entailing no
payment on the part of France.
This is in the nature of indemnity. No
obligation with respect to uniformity of tolls
appears to rest upon France in connection
with the use of these international bridgee.
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Articles 68-71. Additional economic advan-
tages are given to France, including ex-
emption from customs duties on natural or
manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine
entering Germany and the import into Al-
sace-Lorraine of certain goods from Ger-
many free from internal duties in Ger-
many; supply of electric current to Alsace-
Lorraine by Germany; prohibition of Ger-
man participation in enterprises in Alsace-
Lorraine; renunciation of German rights
regarding trade in potash sales.
These are in the nature of indemnity.
Article 74. The French government reserves
the right to retain and liquidate all the
property, rights and interests which Ger-
man nationals or societies controlled by
Germany possessed in Alsace-Lorraine on
November 11, 1918. Germany will com-
pensate her nationals thus dispossessed.
The product of these liquidations shall be
applied in accordance with the stipulations
of Sections III and IV of Part X of the
treaty.
Section III (Article 296) provides for
the settlement through clearing offices to
be established by each of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the following classes of
debts:
(a) Debts due before the war from a
national of an Allied or Associated power,
residing within its territory, to a national
of Germany or her allies, residing in its
territory.
(b) Debts payable during the war to na-
tionals of Allied or Associated powers,
payment of which was suspended by the
war.
(c) Any interest accrued before or dur-
ing the war on securities issued by Ger-
many or her allies.
(d) Any capital sums which have be-
come payable in respect of securities issued
by Germany or her allies.
The High Contracting Parties will pro-
hibit all settlements otherwise than through
the clearing offices; they will he respec-
tively responsible for the payment of such
debts as were due from their nationals.
(Debts due by inhabitants of invaded terri-
tory will not be thus guaranteed, nor does
the guarantee extend to a debtor who was
insolvent before the war or whose property
was liquidated under emergency legisla-
tion).
This Article and its references (Sections
31 and IV of Part X) commit the Allied and
Associated governments to the confiscation of
al private property of German nationals,
whether situated in their own territories or
in the territories taken from Germany, and
restitution of or compensation for all private
property of nationals of Allied or Associated
Powers in German hands. It is true that it
is declared that Germany will compensate her
nationals who are thus dispossessed, but in
view of the extent of the various indemnities
imposed it is doubtful that this declaration
can ever be fulfilled. It is therefore, at best,
disguised confiscation.
From antiquity to the dawn of the 19th
century it was the custom of a belligerent
to seize and convert the private property of
nationals of his enemy, while the private ene-
my individual might be dealt with after the
desires of the captor. In the last century,
however, a settled distinction in the law has
differentiated the private unarmed enemy per-
son and his property from the public armed
enemy person and public property, on the
principle that war is a relation between states
and not between individuals. The former,
classified as non-combatant, is entitled to pro-
tection in his person and property; the latter,
classified as combatant, may be made the ob-
ject of direct hostile action. As to public
property, all movables of the enemy govern-
ment are liable to confiscation. Private
property is under the protection of written
law, declaring it to be inviolable. (The
Hague, 1907, Convention IV, Article 46).
This must be understood to be qualified,
however, by certain definite exceptions. (See
Comment on Article 63, sub-section 9).
Private settlements of debts between a
national of an Allied or Associated Power
and a national of Germany or her allies
is assimilated even after peace to trading
with the enemy and will involve "the same
penalties as are at present provided" in
such legislation. All legal processes for
the private recovery of such debts will be
prohibited.
Creditors shall give notice to the Clear-
ing Office within six months of debts due
to them.
Any person having claimed payment of
an enemy debt which is not admitted in
whole or in part shall pay to the Clearing
Office, by way of fine, interest at 5 per cent
on the part not admitted, during the pen-
dency of such claim.
A person "having unduly refused to ad-
mit the whole or part of a debt claimed
from him" shall pay, by way of fine, 5 per
cent of the amount "with regard to which
his refusal shall be disallowed."
Clearing offices shall be responsible for
the collection of such fines, which "will
be credited to the other Clearing Office,
which shall retain them as a contribution
toward the costs" of the office.
A Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is set up as
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a court of appeal as between disagreeing
Clearing Offices.
This would require an Act of Congress to
carry it into execution.
As to the universally recognized rule of
law forbidding the confiscation of private
enemy debts, see, infra, Comment opposite
Article 302.
Section IV. (Article 297) sets out the fol-
lowing with respect to the private prop-
erty, rights and interests of German na-
tionals situated in Allied and Associated
countries:
(a) Germany shall immediately discon-
tinue all war measures (including liquida-
tion and transfer) taken against the prop-
erty, rights and interests of nationals of
Allied and Associated Powers, such nation-
als to enjoy full rights in accordance with
Article 298.
(b) The Allied and Associated govern-
ments reserve the right to retain and
liquidate all property, rights and interests
belonging to German nationals, or com-
panies controlled by them within their
territories, colonies, possessions and pro-
tectorates, including the territories ceded.
German nationals shall not be able to
dispose of such property nor to subject it
to any charges.
German nationals who acquire ipso facto
the nationality of an Allied or Associated
Power shall not be liable to such depriva-
tion of their private property.
It appears under this sub-section that the
United States is empowered to seize, in addi-
tion to the private property situated in the
United States of German nationals resident in
Germany already sequestered by the Alien
Property Custodian, the private property of
all German nationals resident in the United
States. An Act of Congress would, however,
be necessary as a condition precedent to the
exercise of that power.
"What we have said of the detention of the
enemy's person also holds good with respect
to the right to seize and confiscate all enemy
property found within the territory of the
other belligerent at the commencement of
hostilities. In former times this right was
exercised with great rigor, but it has now
become an established, though not inflexible
rule of international law, that such property
is not liable to confiscation as prize of war.
This rule, says Chief Justice Marshall (Brown
vs. United States, 8 Cranch, R. 123) "like
other precepts of morality, of humanity and
even of wisdom, is addressed the judgment
of the sovereign-it is a guide which he fol-
lows or abandons at his will; and, although
it can not be disregarded by him without
obloquy, yet it may be disregarded." (Hal-
leck, 4th ed., Vol. 1, p. 587).
The power to confiscate enemy property
cannot be exercised by the United States,
however, except by the direct authprity of
Congress. (Brown vs. United States, 8
Cranch, R. 123). The extent of authority
existing in the absence of such legislation is
to sequester using reasonable care to conserve
such property for its owners, under an obli-
gation to restore it or its equivalent at the
peace as we have done through the law creat-
irg the Alien Property Custodian. Even this
right is generally qualified by treaty. (See
Treaty with Prussian, 1828, 2 Malloy, p.
1496).
The far-reaching effect of this policy is
likely to hamper American investments all
over the world.
(e) Nationals of Allied and Associated
Powers shall be entitled to compensation in
respect of damage or injury to their prop-
erty, rights or interests, including any
company in which they are interested, due
to war measures of liquidation or transfer;
and they may be compensated out of pri-
vate property of German nationals in the
hands of Allied and Associated govern-
ments. Germany will receive credit on the
reparation account as to any balances,
which shall be paid to the Reparation Com-
mission.
(i) Germany undertakes to compensate
her nationals thus deprived of their pri-
vate property by the Allied and Associated
Powers.
(j) The amount of all capital taxes lev-
ied on property of Allied and Associated
nationals by Germany after November 11,
1918, shall be refunded.
See Comment opposite Article 74.
By Sections a and b (Article 298) Ger-
many undertakes to restore to nationals of
Allied and Associated Powers their prop-
erty, rights and interests as they existed
prior to the war, and not to subject such
property, rights and interests to any mea-
sures not applied equally to property of
German nationals.
By Annex, paragraph i, under Section
IV, Germany confirms all acts of Allied
and Associated Powers with respect to the
property of German nationals.
By paragraph 2. Germany agrees that no
claim or action shall be brought against
any Allied or Associated Power or person
on account of acts or omissions with re-
spect to German property.
By paragraph 10, Germany will, within
six months, deliver to each Allied or Asso-
ciated Power, all securities, certificates,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss3/1
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO THE TREATY OF PEACE
deeds or other documents of title held by
its nationals and relating to property,
rights or interests situated in the territory
of that Allied or Associated Power, includ-
ing any shares, stock, debentures, debei-
ture stock, or other obligation of any com-
pany incorporated in accordance with the
laws of that power. She will further fur-
nish any information desired concerning
property of her nationals so situated.
On the whole, it may be said that in the
pursuit of large indemnities the Allied and
Associated governments have in these Arti-
Clns repudiated principles, which, in the lan-
guage of Spaight, the eminent English pub-
icist, constitute the Magna Charta of war
law. (War Rights on Land, p. 374). And
since the remaining great powers have con-
eerted in its repudiation it may be assorted
that they have brought to naag9ht the en
lightened and laborious work of a century in
t*is regard.
By the concluding paragraph of the
Annex the foregoing provisions are de-
clared to apply to industrial, literary and
artistic property.
This provision appears, with respect to
some of the signatories, to make a "scrap
of paper ' of the "Revised Berne Convention"
for the protection of copyrights, signed No-
vember 13, 1908, and other similar treaties.
(See Comment Article 286).
SECTION VI.-AUSTRIA.
Article 80. Germany acknowledges and will
respect strictly the independence of Aus-
tria within frontiers to be fixed and agrees
that the independence is inalienable.
Provision in the new German Constitu-
tion for a seat for an Austrian delegate in
the German Reichsrat was held by the Prin-
eipal Allied and Associated Powers to be
violative of this obligation "to respect" Aus-
trian independence. (Compare with the
mutual obligation "to respect" the territorial
integrity and existing political independence,
under Article 10.) The racial cheracteris-
tics of what is left of Austria are predomi-
nantly German, the subject peoples of the old
dual monarchy having been accorded the
right of self-determination. Yet the achieve-
ment of German unity is forever forbidden.
This ignores the inexorable lessons of his-
tory and makes for Irredentism.
SECTION VII.-CZECHOSLOVAK STATE.
Articles 81-83. Germany recognizes the in-
dependence of the Czecho-Slovak state and
renounces all rights and title over a portion
of Silesian territory therein described.
See Comment under Article 36.
Article 84. German nationals habitually resi-
dent in territories recognized as forming
part of the Czecho-Slovak state will obtain
Czecho-Slovak nationality ipso facto and
lose their German nationality.
Article 85. Within a period of two years
German nationals over 18 years of age
habitually resident in such territories may
opt for German nationality; "within the
same period Czecho-Slovaks who are Ger-
man nationals and are in a foreign coun-
try will be entitled, in the absence of any
provision to the contrary in the foreign
law, and if they have not acquired the
foreign nationality by complying with the
requirements laid down by the Czecho
Slovak state."
See Comment under Article 37.
Article 86. The Czecho-Slovak state agrees
to embody in a treaty with the Allied and
Associated power provisions for the pro-
tection of inhabitants differing from the
majority in race, language or religion.
See Treaty of Berlin, 1878, Articles 5, 25,
35 and 44, recognizing conditional inde-
pendence of Bulgaria, Roumania, Servia and
Montenegro. (Martens, N. R. G. 2nd Ser.
111, p. 449).
This implies the right, and perhaps the
duty of intervention.
(To be continued.)
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